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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we take advantage of a uniquely detailed dataset on firm-level exports of both goods 
and services to show that demand complementarities between services and goods enable firms to 
boost their manufacturing exports by also providing services. The positive causal effect of services 
accounts for up to 25% of the manufacturing exports of bi-exporters (i.e. the firms that export both 
goods and services), and 12% of overall goods exports from Belgium. We find that by associating 
services with their goods, bi-exporters increase both the quantities and the prices of their goods. To 
rationalize these findings, we develop a new model of oligopolistic competition featuring one-way 
complementarity between goods and services, product differentiation, and love for variety. By 
supplying services with their goods, firms increase their market share, and hence their market 
power and markup. The model then shows that exporting services acts as a demand shifter for 
firms, increasing the perceived quality of their products. Going back to the data, we find strong 
confirmation for this mechanism.  
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1 Introduction
Economists and policymakers generally consider goods and services as two distinct
sectors subject to their own market adjustments, calling for specific policies. Yet,
this is at odds with what we observe for many big firms. Examples include: Apple
selling software and assistance with the utilization of its computers and cell phones,
Toyota providing both cars and loans to consumers buying these cars, Technip supplying
fertilizers as well as technical and financial solutions related to their utilization.
In this paper, we challenge the view that goods and services are two independent
items in the consumer portfolio supplied by firms in separate industries. Thanks to
a unique dataset recording both goods and services exports at the firm-destination
level, we show both empirically and theoretically that the provision of services allows
firms to boost their goods sales. The effect is quantitatively important. Based on our
regression results, it appears that up to 12% of overall Belgian manufacturing exports
and up to 25% of the manufacturing exports of those firms that export both goods and
services (called hereafter “bi-exporters”) are triggered by the provision of services. The
increase in sales is the combination of a price and a quantity effect: when they provide
services together with their goods, bi-exporters set a higher price for their goods and
still sell higher quantities. Note that this is the price of the good alone: the service
is subject to a transaction in its own right in the data; therefore, services act as a
demand shifter for the goods. In order to theoretically endogenize this mechanism,
we provide a new model that features one-way complementarity between goods and
services, love for variety, and oligopolistic competition. These results have important
implications. First, they suggest that the frontier between manufacturing and services
is blurred. This should affect the way we think of structural change: the expansion
of the service sector is not necessarily at the expense of manufacturing. Second, they
question the way we should define the relevant markets for competition policy and the
design and negotiation of trade agreements. Finally, our mechanism is more general
than the goods-service case and can be applied to any firm’s output that exhibits the
same one-way complementarity. One easy example is represented by the relationship
between the iPad and the iPad cover. The identification and analysis of the one-way
complementarity between all the possible pairs of products are beyond the scope of this
paper, but they represent interesting research avenues that we leave for future work.
The paper is organized into three main blocks. In the first one, we use detailed trade
data from the National Bank of Belgium (NBB henceforth) to provide several stylized
facts on bi-exporters. We show that firms that export both goods and services represent
only 10% of goods exporters, but they account for about 50% of overall goods exports
and 35% of services exports. They outperform the other firms in all dimensions: they
are larger in terms of sales, employees, product and destination scope; and they are
more productive and more often multinationals. Moreover, these firms almost never
export services alone, and they export services in only 26% of the destinations where
they export goods. When present, services represent only a fraction of the goods export
flow. The last two elements reveal an asymmetry in the relationship between goods and
services within the same firm, the good being the essential activity. Finally, comparing
firm-product-destination export flows that are associated with services to those that are
not, we find that services provision is correlated with higher manufacturing sales; this
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premium holds when we control for both firm-product-year and destination-product-
year fixed effects, and for a number of other observable characteristics.
In a second step, we seek an unbiased estimate of the effect of services provision on
firm-level goods export performance. Indeed, despite the presence of multiple controls
and fixed effects, it could still be the case that unobserved firm-country specific factors
could explain both why firms export services in a given destination and also sell large
quantities of their goods. We thus rely on an IV strategy proposed by Wooldridge (2002)
for the case of endogenous dummy variables. Our excluded variable is constructed as
the interaction between a “bundleability” index that measures how much the products
in the firm’s portfolio can be associated with services, with a proxy for the easiness
of trade in services to a given destination. Considering that our excluded variable
is a combination of a product-specific technical parameter and a proxy for country-
specific conditions for services trade, we can reasonably argue that it is not directly
correlated with the unobserved supply and demand shocks that are specific to a firm
and a destination. Using this strategy, we confirm the causal positive effect of services
provision on firm-level goods export performance in a destination, and we show that
this effect is a combination of a price (unit value) and a quantity effect.
These findings show that a service is not just an additional output that broadens
a firm’s product scope: it raises the price and the quantity of the goods with which
it is exported. To rationalize these facts, in the third block we develop a new model
of oligopolistic competition in markets where goods and services are one-way essential
complements. This means that the service itself does not raise the utility of the con-
sumer unless it is associated with a good. In this way, the product is essential while
the service is optional. A firm in our model can be seen as a two-product firm whose
core product is the good alone while its peripheral product is a good-service bundle.
In an environment featuring a taste for variety (or equivalently a variety of tastes),
supplying the bundle naturally raises the demand for the good. This translates into a
larger market share, and thus higher markups over the marginal cost of production of
the good accounting for the price premium of bi-exporters. We also consider direct ex-
tensions of standard models of multi-product firms under monopolistic competition or
oligopoly with and without cost linkages and show that they cannot rationalize simply
these patterns. In other words, both the assumptions of oligopolistic competition and
asymmetric demand complementarities are key to replicate the patterns we observe in
the data.
Intuitively, by raising both the demand and the price of the goods, services provision
acts as a demand shifter for the goods; or put differently, services increase the perceived
quality of the good. Our model puts some structure on this intuition by generating a
firm-product-destination demand shifter similar to that in Khandelwal et al. (2013): all
else equal, the perceived quality of a good exported should be larger for bi-exporters.
This is indeed what we find in the data: a one standard deviation increase in the prob-
ability of providing services increases the firm-product-destination index of perceived
quality by 20% of a standard deviation.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, with the increasing
availability of detailed firm-level data, the theoretical and empirical literature on the
sources of firm success has thrived over the past twenty years. Limiting the scope to
the international trade literature, two main determinants have been emphasized: pro-
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ductivity (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003) and quality (e.g. Johnson, 2012;
Crozet et al., 2012). How these differences then translate into heterogeneous markups
has also been discussed in some contributions (e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Loecker
and Warzynski, 2012). Hottman et al. (2016) develop a model of multi-product firms
that encompasses all these aspects, and structurally estimate the relative contributions
of these various determinants of firm performance. They find that appeal/quality of
products and product scope account for 80% of the observed variation in overall sales
of US firms. In their model, the products supplied by a firm are imperfect substi-
tutes. In our model, productivity, product appeal, and markups are related through
the combination of one-way complementarity between goods and services, imperfect
substitutability between the good alone and the good provided with the service, and
consumers’ love for variety. By providing services with their goods, more productive
firms increase the demand for their good and can, in turn, increase their markup, which
leads to improving the perceived quality of their products.
Second, replicating the price/markup up effect we find in the data is difficult to
reconcile with monopolistic competition. Considering instead an oligopolistic market
structure is motivated by the fact that, in our data, bi-exporters are found among
the largest Belgian exporters. In this respect, our paper echoes recent empirical and
theoretical works that show that the largest firms in the economy significantly deviate
from perfectly or monopolistically competitive firms in many dimensions. Exchange
rate pass-through (Berman et al., 2012; Amiti et al., 2014), price interactions between
firms (Amiti et al., 2016), and adjustment to trade liberalization (Edmond et al., 2015)
are some examples where allowing for strategic behavior of firms is important to account
for the patterns observed in the data. Several recent contributions plead to go further
in this direction (Bernard et al., 2016; Neary, 2016; Head and Spencer, 2017). We
contribute to this literature by showing both empirically and theoretically how the
range of activities of a firm impacts its market share and pricing behaviour.
The literature on multi-product exporters analyzes the choice of firms to provide
multiple products (e.g. Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Dhingra, 2013;
Nocke and Yeaple, 2014; Mayer et al., 2014; Hottman et al., 2016). In multi-product
firm models under monopolistic competition, it is assumed that the behavior of a firm is
isomorphic to the behavior of a set of single-product firms with different productivities;
therefore, the firms decision to add/drop one product in a given market has no impact on
its other products. By contrast, models of oligopoly emphasize demand linkages within
the firm; however, when products are imperfect substitutes, adding a product tends
to decrease the output of other products. Our model features large firms competing
strategically when the demand features one-way complementarity between goods and
services. This mechanism is also in line with Bernard et al. (2017a) who show that
the size of firm-level product scope allows firms to raise their price conditional on the
quantity sold. Our theory can be seen as one of the ways to micro-found demand-scope
complementarities behind the “carry along” trade phenomenon they emphasize, i.e. the
observation that firms supply and export goods that they do not directly produce.1
Finally, our paper relates to the literature analyzing the structural transformation
of the economy and the increasing participation of manufacturing firms in services ac-
1Eckel and Riezman (2016) study further implications of “carry along” trade.
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tivities. This phenomenon is often viewed as a substitution process: firms progressively
give up producing goods to increasingly specialize in services. This is the consequence
of trade in goods liberalization (Breinlich et al., 2014; Pierce and Schott, 2016), firm
specialization (Bernard and Fort, 2015; Bernard et al., 2017b) or offshoring (Berlingieri,
2014). Our paper provides a different perspective by showing that the production and
exports of goods and services can be complementary. Consistent with our results,
Crozet and Milet (2017) show that French firms in the manufacturing sector that start
selling services increase their profitability and total sales of goods. Using Belgian data
on overall sales, Blanchard et al. (2017) show that the probability to provide both goods
and services is a non-linear function of firm-level productivity. Focusing on imports,
Ariu et al. (2017) estimate a general equilibrium model in which goods and services are
imported intermediate inputs that may generate synergies within the firm. These pa-
pers remain silent on the various mechanisms underlying the complementarity between
goods and services and their consequences for producers’ behavior. We empirically doc-
ument this complementarity using export data, quantify the boosting effect of services
on international goods sales, disentangle the different channels and rationalize them in
an original micro-founded model able to replicate our empirical findings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the data and outline sev-
eral stylized facts on bi-exporters in section 2. Based on this evidence, we seek a causal
relationship between the service provision and the export performance in section 3. To
provide a theoretical basis for our empirical results, we develop in section 4 an imperfect
competition model featuring both consumers’ love for variety and one-way complemen-
tarity between goods and services. Section 5 discusses alternative explanations for our
results, and, finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Data description and stylized facts
2.1 Data
The data used in this paper comes from three different datasets provided by the National
Bank of Belgium. They contain information on trade in goods (NBB Trade in Goods
dataset), trade in services (NBB Trade in Services dataset) and firms’ balance-sheets
(NBB Business Registers) from 1997 to 2005.
Information on trade in goods is organized at the firm-product-destination-year level,
and we have information on the exported values and quantities. Firms are identified
by their VAT number and products are classified following the 6-digit Harmonized
System Nomenclature (HS6). We restrict our analysis to transactions involving a change
in ownership and we discard those referring to movements of stocks, replacement or
repair of goods, processing of goods, returns, and transactions without compensation.
Declaration thresholds are applied to collect this data. In particular, firms have to
declare to the NBB any transaction directed to extra-EU countries exceeding 1,000
Euros, and this threshold has remained stable over time. For flows directed to EU
countries instead, firms have to declare their transactions if their total exports in the
European Union are above 250,000 Euros in the previous year (this threshold was equal
to 104,115 Euros in 1997).
4
Data on services exports are collected by the NBB to compile the balance of pay-
ments. For the period we consider, the biggest firms had to declare directly to the
NBB any service transaction with a foreign firm exceeding 12,500 Euros (9,000 Euros
from 1997 to 2001); Belgian firms had to declare the export destination, the type of
service, and the value of the transaction. For all other firms, the bank involved in
the transaction was legally bounded to record the same information and send it to the
NBB. As compared to data from other countries, which are generally survey-based,
the peculiarity of the Belgian collection system is that it provides a quasi-exhaustive
picture of firms, services, and destinations involved in services trade up to 2005.2 The
dataset is organized at the firm-service-destination-year level, firms are identified by
their VAT number, and services are classified following the usual Balance of Payments
codes. We drop from the original data all the transactions referring to “Merchanting”
and “Services between Related Enterprises” because the first also includes the values of
the goods involved and the second does not indicate which service is traded within the
firm and is possibly contaminated by transfer pricing issues.3
Quite uniquely, we are able to put together information on goods and services ex-
ports thanks to the common VAT and destination identifiers. We thus construct a
dataset at the firm-product-destination-year level, which gathers information on ex-
ported values and quantities for goods (and thus on unit values, which we also refer
to as prices in the paper), and on the presence of services exports in the destination.
The exhaustiveness of the trade in services dataset is a great advantage here since it
allows us to correctly identify the “bi-exporters”, i.e. the goods exporters that also
export services in a given destination. As the purpose of the paper is to compare firms
that export only goods to firms that export both goods and services, we do not keep
firms that export only services in our final sample, but we use them for some of our
descriptive statistics. Note also that our data is not transaction-level data so that we
cannot ascertain that both goods and services are sold to the same buyer in a given
market. Moreover, whenever a firm exports more than one product in a market, the
information on the services exports is attached to every product. Finally, it is not
possible to account for the fact that services and goods might not be delivered at the
same time; therefore, there might be some noise in the measurement of bi-exporting.
If anything, this should induce an attenuation bias in the estimation of the effect of
services provision on firm-level goods export performance.
We complete the resulting dataset with firms’ balance-sheet information. We get
from the Business Registers (which cover the population of firms required to file their
unconsolidated accounts to the NBB) the firm-level turnover, value-added, number
of employees, as well as the industry code of the firm (at the NACE 2-digit level).4
We also use information on the presence of foreign affiliates abroad and on foreign
2After 2005 the collection system has become survey-based; therefore, it is not possible to extend
our analysis to more recent years. Refer to Ariu (2016) for more information about the change in the
collection system.
3The data comprises modes one, two and four of trade in services defined in the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS). However, since firms do not declare the transaction mode, there is no
direct way to infer it.
4This information is not available for the smallest firms; since they account for a very small share
of aggregate exports, we can safely say that this is a minor issue.
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ownership status of the firm from the NBB FDI Survey.5 In all of our estimations, we
control by means of adequate dummies for the multinational nature of exporters and
for the presence of affiliates or headquarter in the destination of exports. Moreover,
in robustness checks, we show that our results hold when we discard flows directed to
destinations where firms have foreign affiliates and/or parent firms. In this way, we
ensure that all potential intra-firm trade flows are excluded from the analysis.
We drop wholesalers’ exports (NACE codes 51 and 52), because they act as interme-
diaries while we want to focus on firms that produce most of the products they export.
We finally perform a basic cleaning of the dataset. We drop observations with missing
information on unit value or turnover per worker and exclude flows for which the unit
value is below 0.01, or above 100 times, the median observed among Belgian exporters
for each HS6 product-year. We end up with a dataset counting more than 2 million
flows and nearly 10,000 firms per year. Table A-1 in the Appendix provides some basic
descriptive statistics.
2.2 Stylized facts
In this subsection, we present some stylized facts on the bi-exporting phenomenon.
We analyze its frequency and magnitude, the asymmetric relationship between goods
and services for bi-exporting firms, and the performance of bi-exporters compared to
standard goods exporters.
2.2.1 Stylized fact 1: bi-exporting is a rare activity, but it accounts for an
important share of overall goods and services exports.
In our sample, we observe that during the 1997 to 2005 period, only 6.9% of firm-
product-destination goods export flows are associated with firm-level services exports.
In terms of the number of firms, bi-exporters represent only 10.3% of goods exporters.
To provide a benchmark, we compare the number of bi-exporting firms with the number
of firms that export more than one product (i.e. multi-product exporters). In our data,
we observe that 68.1% of goods exporters provide more than one product in foreign
markets; therefore, bi-exporting is a very rare activity across firms as compared to
multi-product exporting.
Despite being a quite infrequent activity, bi-exporting represents a substantial share
of the value of goods exports. Over the period, flows of goods associated with services
represent 22.1% of overall goods exports and bi-exporters account for 47.6% of the
value of overall goods exports. Almost half of the overall manufacturing exports in our
5To be included in this survey firms have to comply with at least one of the following requirements:
i) have more than 5 million Euros of financial assets; ii) have more than 10 million Euros equity; iii)
have more than 25 million Euros turnover; iv) report foreign participations in their annual accounts;
v) publish information related to new investments abroad in the Belgian Official Journal. For outward
FDI, the survey has information on all of the foreign affiliates in which the firm has more than 10% of
the common shares with details about the country, sector (NACE 2-digit), and total turnover of the
affiliate. For inward FDI, we have information on all of the foreign owners with more than 10% of the
common shares with indication of the origin and sector of the investors and the percentage of equity
in their hands.
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Table 1: Composition of services exports (%)
“Pure” service export flows Bi-exporting flows
Overall value # flows Overall value # flows
Transport 38.23% 28.49% 26.16% 16.92%
Travel 16.61% 7.24% 2.54% 4.95%
Communication 3.78% 2.78% 14.09% 6.54%
Construction 3.90% 5.02% 8.67% 9.34%
Insurance 2.09% 5.27% 0.13% 1.82%
Finance 7.49% 5.14% 2.39% 10.10%
Computer 5.15% 7.37% 13.32% 8.38%
Royalties 1.09% 1.37% 8.36% 3.47%
Business 20.23% 34.21% 23.77% 36.76%
Personal and Cultural 1.18% 2.86% 0.47% 1.52%
Government 0.24% 0.23% 0.10% 0.20%
sample is in the hands of 10.3% of firms exporting both goods and services in at least
one destination. Note that the bi-exporters in our sample are also not negligible for
aggregate services exports: bi-exporting flows represent 19% of overall services exports
and bi-exporters account for 34% of overall services exports. Moreover, the composition
of bi-exporters’ services exports differs from the composition of “pure” services export
flows, i.e. from firms that only export services. Table 1 shows that when firms sell
goods together with their services, communication, construction, finance, computer,
royalties, and business services account for a higher share of exported flows and/or
exported values as compared to firm-level flows originating from firms selling services
only. On the other hand, transport, travel, and insurance services are less represented.
This shows that the services provided by bi-exporters do not just mirror the activities
of “pure” service exporters: there is something specific in providing services together
with goods.
Finally, if we look at the share of bi-exporting flows at the industry-level, aircraft and
spacecraft (HS88), railway et al. (HS86), ores, slag and ash (HS26), fertilizers (HS31),
and inorganic chemicals (HS28) are the industries in which we observe the highest share
of trade flows associating services with goods. At the product-level, many goods from
the transportation, chemical, and machinery/electrical industries exhibit above-average
shares of bi-exporting flows.
2.2.2 Stylized fact 2: bi-exporters export services mostly along with goods.
We focus now on the relationship between services and goods within the firm. In
terms of frequency, on average bi-exporters offer services alone in only 14.9% of the
destinations they serve (median equal to 0), while they export goods alone in 59.5%
of the destinations where they are present (median equal to 75.0%). This tells us
that whenever bi-exporters offer services, they do so in destinations in which they also
export goods. Goods, on the other hand, are frequently exported by bi-exporters in
destinations where they do not provide services, which means that the relationship
between goods and services is asymmetric within bi-exporters.
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Focusing on bi-exporters that export goods to several destinations, we observe that
bi-exporting occurs in only 26.3% of the destinations where they are present. Multi-
product exporters, instead, sell more than one product in 46.3% of the destinations
they serve;6 hence, bi-exporting is much less frequent than multi-product exporting,
not only across firms, but also within firms. Moreover, this highlights that there is
some variation in the occurrence of bi-exporting within firms across destinations that
can be exploited for identification.
In terms of export shares, when firms export both goods and services in a desti-
nation, services represent, on average, 38.1% of bi-exporters’ overall exports in that
destination. If we consider total exports of bi-exporters (across all destinations), ser-
vices represent an average of 33.2% of overall firm-level foreign sales;7 hence, goods
remain, on average, the primary activity of bi-exporters.
2.2.3 Stylized fact 3: bi-exporting is associated with better goods export
performance both across and within firms.
The fact that bi-exporters are few but account for a substantial share of exports sug-
gests that bi-exporters are larger than the other goods exporters. To analyze this
feature more in depth, we compare bi-exporters to multi-product and single-product
exporters. We regress various firm-level performance indicators on dummies identifying
bi-exporters and multi-product exporters, controlling for industry (NACE 2-digit)-year
fixed effects. The reference category in this setting is represented by single-product
exporters. Considering that 86.9% of bi-exporters are also multi-product exporters, the
coefficient on the bi-exporter dummy should be interpreted as a premium on the top of
the one accruing to multi-product firms. Table 2 shows that multi-product exporters
outperform single-product exporters in all dimensions: they export more, have a wider
portfolio in terms of products and destinations, they are larger in terms of employees
and sales, more productive, and more likely to have affiliates abroad and to be foreign-
owned firms. Newer to the literature, in all of these dimensions bi-exporters have an
even larger premium as compared to multi-product firms. This additional premium is
often substantial (see total exports, turnover, or turnover per employee); therefore, bi-
exporters are superstars among the already exclusive club of multi-product exporting
firms.
To go further in the assessment of the bi-exporters’ success, we compare goods
export flows associated with services to flows without services within the same product-
destination-year by means of the following regression:
Log Expfkdt = α0 + α1Servfdt + α2Xf(kd)t + λkdt + fkdt (1)
where Log Expfkdt indicates the (log) exported value of firm f for product k in
6When we compute the frequency of bi-exporting and multi-product exporting at the firm-product
level, these shares rise to 39.4% and 91.1% respectively. This rise reflects the fact that not all the
products in the export portfolio of a firm are sold together with services or with other goods. Taking
this into account, bi-exporting still remains much rarer than multi-product exporting.
7The medians equal 27.5% and 10.7%, respectively.
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Table 2: Bi-Exporters’ Characteristics
Ln Goods # of # of # of Ln Turnover Ln Turnover per 1 Affiliates 1 Foreign
Exports Destinations Products Employees Employee Abroad Owned
Bi-Exporter 1.900a 0.637a 0.513a 1.316a 1.519a 0.203a 0.046a 0.031a
(0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Multi-Product 3.166a 1.185a 1.676a 0.740a 1.011a 0.270a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.017) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 98,454 98,454 98,454 98,454 98,454 98,454 98,454 98,454
R-squared 0.497 0.448 0.575 0.264 0.260 0.198 0.032 0.030
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include industry (NACE 2-digit)-year fixed effects. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
country d and year t. Among the explanatory variables, Servfdt is our main variable of
interest: it is a dummy that is equal to 1 when firm f bi-exports, i.e. when it also exports
services in destination d at time t. λkdt is a product-destination-year fixed effect, and the
vector Xf(kd)t contains firm-year, firm-destination-year, and firm-product-destination-
year covariates. In particular, we control for the log number of products exported by
firm f in destination d, the experience of firm f with product k in country d8 and the
log turnover per worker of firm f as a measure of the average productivity of the firm at
time t. We also identify multinational firms thanks to a dummy, MNEft, as well as the
destinations where they have foreign affiliates (AFFfdt) and/or parent firms (PARfdt).
Finally, we control for a dummy that equals 1 if the firm belongs to the service sector.
Results are presented in column (1) of Table 3. The dummy identifying bi-exporting
flows (Servfdt) is positive and significant: all else equal, for a given product in a given
destination market, bi-exporters sell on average 58% more than normal goods exporters
(i.e. firms that only provide goods). Bi-exporters are, therefore, not just larger firms
overall, but they also outperform normal goods exporters in terms of goods sales in
the destinations where they provide services. Control variables have the expected sign:
more productive, more experienced, and multinational firms sell more. On the contrary,
firms that declare a service sector as their main activity sell less. This is consistent with
the idea that their competitive advantage does not lie in manufacturing activities. Also,
in this specification, the higher the number of products sold by a firm in a market, the
lower its sales for a given good.
In column (2) of Table 3, we further control for firm-product-year fixed effects. In
this way, we can wash away any firm-product-year determinant of export performance
that is correlated with the provision of services, such as unobserved firm-product pro-
ductivity. The estimation now amounts to a difference-in-difference where, for a given
product and a given year, we compare in two different destinations firms that never
export services with their product to firms that export services in one destination but
not in the other. In this more demanding specification, bi-exporting is still associated
with a premium in terms of goods export values. It is, however, considerably reduced
and equal to nearly 27%. The lower premium in column (2) as compared to column (1)
suggests that bi-exporters have unobserved characteristics that make them able to sell
more of their product whatever the destination; but, even when controlling for these
characteristics, they still outperform the “normal” goods exporters in the destinations
8We proxy experience with the log number of consecutive years of presence of firm f and product
k in country d at time t. Since they are available, we also use trade data for years 1995 and 1996 to
compute this proxy.
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Table 3: Bi-exporting sales premium
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt
(1) (2)
1 Servfdt 0.582
a 0.268a
(0.025) (0.020)
Log # Productsfdt -0.475
a 0.706a
(0.005) (0.006)
Log Turnover/Lft 0.296
a
(0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.491
a 0.962a
(0.005) (0.005)
1 MNEft 0.464
a
(0.012)
1 AFFfdt 0.392
a 0.294a
(0.026) (0.023)
1 PARfdt 0.150
a 0.202a
(0.034) (0.032)
1 Service Industryft -0.398
a
(0.014)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE No Yes
Observations 2,106,302 1,652,189
R-squared 0.482 0.801
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level
in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
where they bi-export. This positive correlation between firm-level sales of goods and
services provision is suggestive of complementarities between the two types of activ-
ities. Regarding the other controls, the main change is observed for the number of
products exported by a firm in a destination, for which the sign of the coefficient is now
reversed. Once we control for firm-product-year fixed effects, it appears that a wider
product scope in a given destination is associated with higher sales, on average, for each
product. The reason why the across-firm specification offers a different picture is that
a firm-level product portfolio is generally composed of one or a few “main” products
and several “fringe” products; multi-product firms might not perform as well for these
fringe products as compared to firms for which these products are the main activity.
The within-firm specification controls for the product-specific ability of the firm and
thus neutralizes this unobserved ability effect.
2.2.4 Further empirical regularities
We present here some additional exercises to qualify more extensively the firm-product-
destination regularities just highlighted. First, we use a different specification with
firm-product-destination and product-destination-year fixed effects. This strategy only
relies on the time variations in the data, comparing the firms that switch status in
terms of bi-exporting to firms that keep the same status over the entire period. In
this more demanding specification, the sales premium remains positive and significant
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(Table A-2 in the Appendix); however, identification here crucially depends on the
exact moment in which firms sell the good and the service. For several services like
technical assistance, maintenance or repair, the export timing of the two activities is not
obviously coincident; still, we might observe both activities in the same year because
they are provided to different consumers. We prefer not enter the question of the timing
here and thus stick to the cross-sectional approach in the rest of the paper.
Second, we divide the service dummy into ten different types of services following the
Balance of Payments nomenclature. We observe in Table A-3 in the Appendix that the
relationship between the provision of services and firm-level sales of goods is positive and
highly significant for Transport, Financial, Computer, and Business services.9 These
services comprise, in particular, firm-level loans for the purchase of their goods, the IT
services related to the installation, and the exploitation of the communication systems,
maintenance, repair, consultancy and assistance with the use of manufacturing goods.
This heterogeneity is thus in line with the idea that the services that are correlated
with higher sales for goods are indeed complementary to them.
Third, Table A-4 in the Appendix shows that the sales premium associated with the
provision of services is much stronger for the core product than for the fringe products
of the firm; hence, there is substantial heterogeneity in the positive correlation between
goods sales and services provision across the products in the bi-exporters’ product
portfolio. That the correlation between goods sales and services provision is much
stronger for the main product, suggests that the fringe products may be themselves
complements of the core product (Bernard et al., 2017a; Eckel and Riezman, 2016).
3 Causal assessment and mechanism
So far, our results show that the provision of services is robustly associated with greater
firm-level sales of goods in a destination. However, even if we control for different
supply- and demand-side determinants of firm-level goods export performance in a
destination, we cannot claim, yet, that this positive correlation reflects a causal and
unbiased effect of services provision on goods sales. As already acknowledged, mea-
surement error in the bi-exporting phenomenon might bias downward the coefficient we
estimate on the dummy Servfdt. Moreover, firm-product-destination unobserved factors
could jointly determine firm-level goods export performance and the decision to provide
services in a destination. More specifically, we can think of two possible sources of en-
dogeneity. First, as shown by di Comite et al. (2014), firms might face country-specific
tastes for their products. This means that for a given product, the relative sales of
firms might vary across markets even though their relative prices remain the same. If
these demand idiosyncrasies apply to all of the items proposed by a firm in a market,
the positive correlation we measure between services provision and firm-level goods ex-
ports in a destination might just reflect the fact that bi-exporters export services in
markets where they specifically face a high demand for their products. Second, Mayer
et al. (2016) show that when multi-product exporters face a positive demand shock,
they skew their sales towards their best performing product and extend the range of
9The coefficient is also positive and significant for Personal and Cultural services, but this concerns
a very small number of flows.
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the products they export to products for which they have a relatively lower productiv-
ity. This complex dynamics of the product mix can thus affect our estimation of the
bi-exporter premium.
We propose in the following an IV strategy to break the firm-product-destination
endogeneity just highlighted, and thus provide evidence of a causal relationship between
the provision of services and the firm-level goods’ export performance. We also shed
light on the channels underlying this effect.
3.1 Estimation strategy
We take the specification in column (2) of Table 3 as our benchmark, and we look for
an unbiased estimation of the coefficient α1 in the following regression:
Log Expfkdt = α0 + α1Servfdt + α2Xfkdt + λkdt + κfkt + fkdt (2)
where Log Expfkdt represents the log value of sales of firm f for product k in destination
d at time t, Xfkdt stands for firm-product-destination-year covariates, λkdt is a product-
destination-year fixed effect, and κfkt a firm-product-year fixed effect. We assume that
the dummy Servfdt is determined by a latent variable and defined as follows:
Servfdt =
{
1 if θXfdt + µdt + ξfdt ≥ 0
0 if θXfdt + µdt + ξfdt < 0
where Xfdt is a vector of firm-year and firm-destination-year covariates, µdt is a destination-
year fixed effect, and ξfdt is the error term. The endogeneity of Servfdt we just discussed
comes from the possible correlation between fkdt and κfkt. To solve for this issue, and
given the dichotomous nature of Servfdt, we follow Wooldridge (2002) and implement
a two-step procedure.10 We first estimate the determinants of the probability that
firm f exports services to destination d at time t thanks to a probit model. We then
use the fitted probabilities from the probit (that are thus purged from the presence
of the firm-product-destination unobserved factors contained in ξfdt) as an instrument
for Servfdt in a standard 2SLS. This method breaks the correlation between ξfdt and
fkdt which causes the endogeneity issue and provides an unbiased estimate of the effect
of services provision on firm-level goods exports. Wooldridge (2002) argues that this
procedure has several advantages. First, the 2SLS standard errors and test statistics
are asymptotically valid: we do not need to adjust the standard errors to account for
the fact that our instrument is an estimated variable. Second, this estimator has nice
robustness properties; in particular, as long as the fitted probabilities are significantly
correlated with the endogenous variable, the probit used to build the instrument does
not need to be correctly specified.11
Note that, in principle, since the vector of fitted probabilities ˆServfdt is a non linear
function of its determinants, this model can work without an excluded variable; how-
10See Chapter 18, section 18.4.1.
11As shown by Imbens and Wooldridge (2007), the robustness of the second step to the specification
of the probit function is also a nice feature of this estimator, as compared to a control function approach
where a probit model would be estimated in the first stage and the inverse Mills ratio introduced as a
regressor in the second stage regression.
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ever, the identification would only come from the non-linearity of the function used to
build the instrument, thus limiting its explanatory power and the precision of the IV
estimates. This is why we decide to introduce into the probit a firm-destination spe-
cific variable that explains why firms export services in a given market without directly
affecting firm-level manufacturing sales in that market. We build this variable as the
interaction between a technological parameter related to the types of goods exported by
the firm (regardless of the destination) and a proxy for country-level barriers to services
trade.
The firm-level technological parameter relies on the idea that not all the products
are equally likely to be associated with services. Depending on both technology and
preferences, some products are certainly more “bundleable” with services than others.
For example, parts of aircraft or data-processing machines are exported frequently with
many services such as installation, maintenance, and repair. Instead, some vegetable
and textile products are never associated with services. In our data, we can compute
for each product k its “bundleability” index. We define it as the average share of
transactions that are bundled with services, computed across all of the Belgian exporters
of product k over the period under study. As mentioned in section 2.2, many goods
from the transportation, chemical, and machinery/electrical industries appear as highly
“bundelable”, and financial, computer and business services are often associated with
goods. The average number of Belgian exporters active in a given HS6 over the period is
equal to 82 and the median, 36; we are thus confident that one single firm cannot directly
affect the “bundleability” index at the product-level. This index is then averaged across
all of the products in the portfolio of firm f in year t. The resulting variable BIft should
be positively correlated with the probability of bi-exporting, and it varies across firms
due to differences in the product portfolio of each firm.
To obtain the second level of variation needed to build an instrument that is firm-
destination specific, and thus varies within firms across markets, we interact the BIft
with the log of overall imports of services by country d at time t SIdt (excluding Belgium
from the trade partners). This interaction takes into account the demand for services in
country d, which is itself a function of the barriers to trade in services and the compar-
ative advantage of d in the production of services.12 This provides the variation needed
to explain why the same firm does not necessarily bi-export in all of the destinations
where it provides goods in a given year.
Since both BIft and SIdt are built using product and/or country-specific information,
we can reasonably assume that they are not directly correlated with the unobserved
firm-product-destination specific determinants of manufacturing success.13
Finally, we also tackle the possible endogeneity of the measure of product scope of
firm f in destination d at time t. As emphasized in the introduction, the same com-
plementarity might, indeed, not solely apply to services, but also between the goods
12This information comes from the Francois and Pindyuk (2013) trade in services database. Note
that, since our specification includes destination-year fixed effects, we do not need to include this
variable alone in the probit.
13Note that, in case of correlated demand shocks between goods and services, country-level services
imports might also proxy for the demand for the goods associated with these services. However, as
long as these correlated demand shocks are common to all potential suppliers of the goods in the
destination country, our destination-product-year fixed effects in the second step capture their direct
effect on firm-level sales of goods.
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exported by multi-product exporters, such as the iPad and its cover. Product scope
is thus subject in our regressions to the same endogeneity concerns as the provision of
services.14 We thus need to find an excluded variable that can explain the number of
products exported by a firm in a given destination and be exogenous to the manufac-
turing sales of that firm in that destination. We propose an instrument whose rationale
is close to the one of the “bundleability” index defined for services exports. For each
HS6 product k, we calculate the average size (across all years and destinations) of the
product scope of the firms that export k. We then average this statistic across all of the
products exported by firm f in country d at time t. This provides us with a predicted
measure of the product scope of firm f in destination d at time t. Again, since it is based
on a technological parameter attached to each of the products in the firm-destination
level portfolio, it should not be correlated with the unobserved firm-product-destination
factors and allow for a proper identification.
3.2 Results
The results of our IV strategy are presented in column (1) of Table 4.15 They confirm
that bi-exporting has a positive and significant causal effect on the goods export values.
Relative to normal goods exporters, bi-exporters export, on average, 75% more of their
goods in destinations where they provide services than in destinations where they do
not. The magnitude of this effect is boosted as compared to the fixed effect estima-
tion, implying that the biases highlighted in the previous subsections were leading to
a downward bias overall. The effect of the product scope on firm-product-destination
sales remains positive and significant after the implementation of our IV strategy, but
contrary to services provision, it is slightly reduced compared to the fixed-effect esti-
mation in column (2) of Table 3. The coefficients on the other variables do not change
much.
To get a sense of how much services matter for aggregate manufacturing exports, we
run the following exercise: we assume that the possibility of exporting services is shut
down for all of the bi-exporting flows in our dataset, and using the coefficient estimated
in column (1) of Table 4, we re-compute the value of these manufacturing flows absent
the service. With this procedure, we find that the overall manufacturing exports of bi-
exporters would decrease by nearly 25% on average, implying a 12% decrease in overall
Belgian manufacturing exports. Of course, this exercise ignores general equilibrium
effects and assumes that services are exported along with all the products sold by a
firm in a destination. For this reason, we should certainly see it as an upper bound of
the contribution of services to manufacturings sales; but it definitely suggests that the
boosting effect of services on manufacturing performance is not negligible and is worthy
of investigation.
Since our data on trade in goods contains the value and the quantity exported, we
can compute the unit value of each firm-product-destination export flow. We can then
use these unit values as a proxy for prices and decompose the sales premium into a
14Please note that the identification of the goods that exhibit the same type of asymmetric relation-
ship as the one documented for goods and services is beyond the scope of this paper.
15The results of the first-stage probit are presented in Table B-1 of Appendix B.
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Table 4: The causal effects of bi-exporting
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
1Servfdt 0.749
a 0.276c 0.474a
(0.161) (0.146) (0.058)
Log # Productsfdt 0.645
a 0.681a -0.035a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.990
a 1.001a -0.011a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
1AFFfdt 0.286
a 0.341a -0.055a
(0.024) (0.020) (0.010)
1PARfdt 0.177
a 0.220a -0.043a
(0.032) (0.031) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,587,271 1,587,271 1,587,271
R-squared 0.802 0.865 0.920
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 111.881
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a
p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
quantity and a price effect. This can help us understand the channels behind the boost
in manufacturing sales caused by the provision of services. The results are displayed in
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 and show that the positive effect on sales is a combination
of both a quantity and a price increase. Relative to normal goods exporters, bi-exporters
charge a price for their good that is 47% higher in destinations where they provide the
service than in destinations where they do not. Importantly, despite this higher price,
bi-exporters manage to sell 28% more in volume. Note that the magnitude of the
impact we measure for unit values is sensible. In our estimation sample, the coefficient
of variation of firm-product unit values across destinations is equal to 0.41,16 i.e. the
same order of magnitude as the price premium associated with bi-exporting. Consumers
are willing to buy more of the product even if it is more expensive. It thus seems that
the association of services acts as a positive demand shifter, making the product more
appealing to consumers. In this sense, services influence the perceived quality of the
product and are an active determinant of the goods export performance of firms.
We provide, in Appendix B, four types of robustness checks. First, in the first-stage
probit, we use two alternative excluded variables by interacting the “bundleability index
BIft with: i) the share of services in the overall imports of the destination d at time t,
IMPSHdt, taken from the Comtrade dataset; ii) the Service Restrictiveness Index, SRId,
computed by the World Bank. In this way, we can check how sensitive the results are
to alternative proxies for country-level openness to services trade (Tables B-2 and B-
3 in Appendix). Second, we exclude from the estimation sample potential outliers by
16For this exercise, we focus on firm-product-year triplets for which we have at least 4 observations
in our sample (i.e. 4 destinations). Quite interestingly, the standard-deviation of unit values within
exporters across markets reported by Manova and Zhang (2012) for Chinese firms is equal to 0.46,
very close to ours. Martin (2012) also reports the within firm-product variation of unit values across
destinations to be large for French firms.
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dropping those firms for which the share of services in overall exports is above 50% (their
core business being on services rather than manufacturing, Table B-4 in the Appendix).
Third, we exclude destinations in which a multinational has either an affiliate or a
parent firm to dissolve any remaining concern about the behavior of multinationals in
countries that are part of their business structure (see table B-5 in Appendix).17 Fourth,
we code the Servfdt dummy equal to one only if the firm exports the services that are
significantly associated with higher sales, as discussed in section 2.2.4 (see Table B-6).
In all of these robustness checks, our results are confirmed.
4 One-way complementarity and perceived quality:
theory and further evidence
Our analysis shows that services provision allows bi-exporters to sell more of their
goods, all else equal, than standard goods exporters. Bi-exporters increase their sales
by charging a higher price for their good and still selling it in higher quantities than
firms that export the good only. Services, then, look like a determinant of the perceived
quality and vertical differentiation of products.
At first sight, these results could seem consistent with multi-product firm models
under monopolistic competition with variable markups (e.g. Mayer et al., 2014, 2016)
and/or quality differences across varieties (e.g. Manova and Yu, 2017). Despite the
ample theoretical development in both directions, we argue here that these models alone
cannot replicate our empirical results. First, absent diseconomies of scope,18 a standard
model of monopolistic competition where each firm can supply a good with or without a
service - a two-product firm - cannot generate the positive effect of services provision on
manufacturing goods’ unit values we find. This is because cross-price elasticities under
monopolistic competition are null by assumption. In other words, the price of the good
and the export of a service are the result of independent decisions. Importantly enough,
this is true whatever the demand system considered is - derived from a CES utility or
not (see also section 5 for a derivation with non-CES preferences). Second, the price
premium we measure is not simply reflecting the cost of providing a service, as would
be the case with any investment in product quality (e.g. Eckel et al., 2015). This is
because, in our data, the provision of a service is accounted for in a separate transaction.
In other words, the price charged by the firm for the service is not embodied in the
unit-value of the good on which our empirical analysis is based. Nevertheless, that bi-
exporting raises both the price and the quantity of the good suggests that bi-exporting
may act as a demand shifter for the good. The model we build in this section will help
us reinterpret the provision of the service as a determinant of the perceived quality of
the good.
Because of the above-mentioned reasons, in this section, we depart from existing
models in two ways. First, we consider a model of oligopolistic competition. Under this
17Remember that in the main specification, intra-firm services trade is already removed from the
estimation sample and we control in the regressions for the fact that a firm has affiliates and/or parent
firms in the destinations where it exports goods.
18See section 5 for a discussion of a supply-side driven price effect.
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assumption, goods and services supplied by a single firm have a direct impact on the
market aggregate - the price index - so that pricing decisions across the service and the
good are naturally inter-related. Second, we consider goods and services as one-way
complements. In the words of Chen and Nalebuff (2006), one-way complementarity
implies that the good is essential to the use of the service but not vice-versa.19 This
second assumption ensures that bi-exporters find it optimal to set a higher price for
their good while setting a strictly positive price for the service.
4.1 Preferences
The economy of destination d features a continuum of consumers who share the same
preferences. Each consumer derives her utility from a Cobb-Douglas function over
different goods k ∈ K:
U :=
∫
Kd
αk ln (Ckd) dk
where the income shares sum up to one:∫
Kd
αkdk = 1
Ckd is the ideal consumption index of good k in destination d and is defined as the
aggregation of the Cfkd consumption indices which are specific to the variety of product
k supplied by firm f in destination d:
Ckd :=
(∫
f∈Ωkd
C
σk−1
σk
fkd df
) σk
σk−1
The set of varieties of product k available in d is defined by Ωkd, and the elasticity
of substitution across varieties is equal to σk. These varieties may be consumed with or
without a service. We denote by gfkd the total consumption of variety fk in destination
d. The amount consumed with a service is denoted by gSfkd ≤ gfkd, and consumption of
the complementary service is denoted by sfkd.
One-way complementarity The consumption index of variety fk in country d is
defined by:
Cfkd =
((
gfkd − gsfkd
)σk−1
σk + min
(
gsfkd, sfkd
)σk−1
σk
) σk
σk−1
where min
(
gsfkd, sfkd
)
is a Leontief aggregator.20
19One-way complementarity can be seen as a special case of mixed bundling (Adams and Yellen,
1976) where there is no demand for the service alone. The analogy, however, is of little use here as
our data does not allow us to consider mixed-bundling pricing: there is only one price (unit value)
observed for each good in a given destination, whether it is bundled or not.
20The model can also accommodate imperfect complementarity through a CES aggregator without
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This specification implies that the consumption sfkd of the service itself does not
raise the utility of the consumer unless she consumes at least gsfkd ≥ sfkd units of the
good with it. This means that the good is essential while the service is optional. The
CES aggregation of the consumption of the good alone and the bundle implies that the
consumer perceives a good and its service-augmented version as two different varieties.21
A mass of Ld consumers own an equal share of the firms in their economy on top of
their labor income. Total income amounts to Id and the budget constraint reads as:∫
Kd
PkdCkddk ≤ Id
where Pkd is the ideal price index of product k in destination d:
Pkd :=
(∫
Ωkd
P1−σkfkd df
) 1
1−σk
The firm-product-destination specific price index aggregates the price of the good alone
and the price of the bundled good. The latter is the sum of the price of the good and
the price of the service pfk + p
s
fk:
Pfkd :=
(
p1−σkfkd +
(
pfkd + p
s
fkd
)1−σk) 11−σk
Demand Utility maximization implies gSfk = sfk and yields the direct demand func-
tions of the good and the service:
d
[
pfkd, p
s
fkd;Pkd
]
= gfkd = αk · Id · Pσk−1kd ·
(
p−σkfkd +
(
pfkd + p
s
fkd
)−σk) (3)
ds
[
pfkd + p
s
fkd;Pkd
]
= gSfkd = αk · Id · Pσk−1kd ·
(
pfkd + p
s
fkd
)−σk (4)
so that total expenditures on good fk and its complementary service are given by:
Efkd := αk · Id ·
(Pfkd
Pkd
)1−σk
qualitatively changing its predictions. This will become clear in section 4.4 when we turn to the
intuitions behind the theoretical channels at play.
21This implies that consumers have a positive demand for both. While it might appear more realistic
to assume heterogeneous consumers, CES preferences can also be seen as a reduced form for a richer
model featuring consumer heterogeneity (see section 5). These preferences can also easily accommodate
vertical differentiation between the two varieties through the introduction of a demand shifter βk such
that Cfkd =
((
gfkd − gsfkd
)σk−1
σk +
(
βk min
(
gsfkd, sfkd
)σk−1
σk
)) σk
σk−1
. Since it does not affect any of
the predictions, we omit it without any loss of generality.
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4.2 Firm technology
In the following, we carry out the analysis at the firm level. We take the perspective
of a domestic firm which decides whether or not to export to destination d and, if so,
whether to export a service or not with its good. All workers in the home country
supply one efficiency unit of labor and their wages are normalized to one. Let cfk and
csfk be firm f ’s marginal costs of production of good k and its complementary service,
respectively. Corresponding trade costs are denoted by τkd and τ
s
kd. These costs are
product-country specific: for instance, the cost of supplying communication services
includes trade costs related to the linguistic distance and the good category with which
it is bundled. For the sake of simplicity, we assume further that all firms supplying
good k face the same proportional cost increment when deciding to supply a service
together with their good.22 Firms that are good at producing the good are also good
at providing the service, which is in line with our descriptive statistics. Last, trade
costs to destination d for the goods and services are assumed to differ up to a product-
specific multiplicative term. Taken together these assumptions allow us to work with a
product-specific cost-increment which is inclusive of trade costs:
ωk := 1 +
τskdc
s
fk
τkdcfk
.
In the absence of fixed costs, since consumers’ reservation price for any variety is
infinite, all firms would find it profitable to provide services with their goods at any
cost. We, therefore, assume that firms incur a fixed cost F b in order to export a service
with their good. The subset of firms that export a service with their variety of good k
in destination d is denoted by Ωbkd.
Exporters’ profits in destination d are given by:
pifkd := (pfkd − τkdcfk)Ld · d
[
pfkd, p
s
fkd;Pkd
]
+(
psfkd − τ skdcsfk
)
Ld · ds
[
pfkd + p
s
fkd;Pkd
] · 1Ωbkd [F b] ∀f ∈ Ωbkd (5)
For a bi-exporter, i.e. 1Ωbkd [F
b] = 1, the maximization problem boils down to one
of a two-product firm whose core competence is the good to be consumed alone while
its side product is made of the good to be consumed with the service. Producing and
shipping the former requires a constant marginal cost τkdcfk while the bundle requires
τkdcfk + τ
s
kdc
s
fk.
4.3 Firm behavior
We do not model how firms initially decide to export. We focus only on their decision
and on the impact of exporting a service along with their good, in line with our empirical
exercise on manufacturing goods exporters.
Before solving the model, we should note that Pkd summarizes the demand linkages
between goods: under monopolistic competition, the impact of the price of any individ-
ual variety on this aggregate would be negligible; therefore the optimal pricing rule of
22This is close in spirit to the multi-product firm model by Mayer et al. (2014) where firms born
with a different productivity for their core product face the same increase in marginal cost as they
expand their product portfolio.
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a firm would be independent on whether this firm is supplying a service or not. Impor-
tantly enough, this is not an artefact of CES preferences; it is due to the fact that under
monopolistic competition, cross-price elasticities of demand are null across the varieties
sold by a firm. Here instead, when oligopolistic firms compete a` la Bertrand (similar
results hold under Cournot), they take into account their impact on the price-index Pkd
(See Anderson et al., 1992; Yang and Heijdra, 1993), and cross-price elasticities across
their product scope are no longer negligible.
4.4 Prices, quantities and sales
The first-order conditions with respect to pfk and p
s
fk lead to the pricing rule:
Mfkd := pfkd/cfkd = psfkd/csfkd (6)
where the mark-up Mfkd is given by:
Mfkd =Mk[Sfkd] := 1 + 1
(σk − 1) (1− Sfkd)
Oligopolistic firms charge a markup that is a convex function of their market share.
Using (3) and (4) leads to the implicit definition of an oligopolistic firm’s market share23
Sfkd:
Pσk−1kd · (τkd · cfk)1−σk ·
(
1 + ω1−σkk · 1Ωbkd
)
= Sfkd · Mk[Sfkd]σk−1 (7)
Equation (7) shows that, all else equal, bi-exporters have a larger market share and
thus charge a higher markup. Plugging the optimal prices into the demand functions
leads to the good and service output chosen by a bi-exporting firm:
gfkd = αk · Id · Pσk−1kd · M−σkfkd · (τkdcfk)−σk ·
(
1 + ω−σkk · 1Ωbkd [F
b]
)
(8)
sfkd = αk · Id · Pσk−1kd · M−σkfkd · (τkdcfk)−σk · ω−σkk · 1Ωbkd [F
b] (9)
Inspecting (8) shows that supplying a service, i.e. 1Ωbkd [F
b] = 1 has two opposite
effects on the quantities of good k sold by firm f in destination d, captured respectively
by
(
1 + ω−σkk
)
and M−σkfkd .
Firms now face a positive demand for the bundled good which increases the demand
addressed to variety fk by a factor
(
1 + ω−σkk
)
. This demand for the bundle, however,
cannibalizes the sales of the good alone. All else equal, firms increase their markup and
restrict their supply of the good alone by a factor M−σkfkd . In a model of monopolistic
competition, there would be no impact on the price, and the output would always
23Our specification of consumer preferences implies that the relevant market on which firms compete,
consists of horizontally differentiated goods and their service-augmented versions. Therefore, the
market share is the share of a firm’s overall sales - including both goods and services sales - relative
to its competitors.
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increase. Under oligopoly, the price effect goes against this increase in output and
could even potentially offset it (in that case, it would have to be that an increase in
the sales of the services does more than offset the decrease in the sales of the good).
Our empirical analysis finds evidence for a price effect which is never strong enough to
reverse the positive impact on output. Furthermore, we show below that, theoretically,
the perceived quality of the good necessarily increases with the provision of the service.
4.5 Perceived quality
Equation (8) shows that, conditional on price, the provision of services acts as a de-
mand shifter for the good. Given this expression, the demand shifter is equivalent to
a factor ηfkd :=
(
1 + ω−σkk · 1Ωbkd [F b]
) 1
σk−1 before the consumed quantity of variety fk
in the utility function of consumers from country d, so that the demand function in
equation (3) could be written as follows:
d
[
pfkd, p
s
fkd;Pkd
]
= gfkd = αk · Id · Pσk−1kd · p−σkfkd · ησk−1fkd (10)
According to our model, supplying a service along with a good translates unam-
biguously into a larger perceived quality of the good. Using (10), we can thus derive a
measure of perceived quality as in Khandelwal et al. (2013). Taking the logarithm of
this expression, we obtain:
ln gfkd + σk ln pfkd = lnαk · Id + (σk − 1) · lnPkd + (σk − 1) · ln ηfkd (11)
From an empirical viewpoint, equation (11) can be estimated with our data as:
ln qfkdt + σk ln uvfkdt = λkdt + fkdt (12)
where qfkdt and uvfkdt are the quantity and price charged by firm f for product
k sold to country d at time t, and λkdt is a product-destination-year fixed effect. We
can then recover the residual, and in light of our model, interpret it as a function of
the estimated firm-product-destination level demand shifter such that ln ηˆfkdt =
ˆfkdt
σk−1 .
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Intuitively, a higher ηfkdt means that, conditional on price, firm f faces a higher demand
for its good than its competitors.
To assess the impact of services provision on the perceived quality of goods, we
apply the same empirical strategy as the one used for values, quantities, and prices
using our measure of perceived quality, ln ηˆfkdt, as the dependent variable. Table 5
shows the results: the provision of services has a positive effect on the perceived quality
of the good. To get a sense of the economic magnitude of these effects, we transform
them into standardized coefficients.25 When considering all the firms in our sample,
we find that a one standard deviation increase in the probability of exporting services
24We use the product-destination specific elasticity of substitution estimated by Broda et al. (2006).
25Put differently, we calculate the effect of one standard deviation of each explanatory variable x as a
share of one standard deviation of the dependent variable y: βx×sdxsdy . Standard deviations are computed
based on the variables demeaned in the product-destination-year and firm-product-year dimensions,
since our regression controls for fixed effects in these dimensions.
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together with goods is associated with a 0.11 increase in the demand shifter. To provide
a benchmark, we compute the same for the product scope variable: a one standard
deviation increases in the size of the product scope is associated with a 0.11 increase
in the demand shifter. When we compute these contributions for bi-exporters only,
these figures are respectively equal to 0.19 and 0.10. While both effects are sizeable,
services provision explains a greater share of the variations in the perceived quality
of bi-exporters’ products across destinations as compared to product scope. We can
thus conclude that services are an important determinant of the perceived quality of
bi-exporters’ products.
Table 5: Perceived quality - IV results
(1)
Dep. Var. ln ηˆfkdt
Servfdt 0.737
a
(0.125)
Log # Productsfdt 0.250
a
(0.011)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.473
a
(0.005)
AFFfdt 0.064
a
(0.021)
PARfdt 0.080
a
(0.025)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes
Observations 1,252,510
R-squared 0.603
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 100.838
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-
year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
5 Alternative interpretations for our results
Our model relies on the assumption of one-way complementarity between goods and
services to explain the patterns we find in the data. We now review alternative inter-
pretations and explanations for both our theoretical and empirical results.
Non-CES preferences under monopolistic competition.
As mentioned at the beginning of section 4, we show briefly below that under mo-
nopolistic competition - even when departing from CES preferences, bundling a service
along with a good does not have any impact on its price. This is why we have considered
an oligopolistic market structure instead.
For the sake of brevity, we normalize population size to one. Each consumer has
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now additively separable preferences across varieties within a sector:
Ckd :=
∫
Kd
(
u(gfkd − gsfkd) + u
(
min
(
gsfkd, sfkd
)))
di
They perceive the good alone and the bundle as two horizontally differentiated
varieties. We assume that u(.) is thrice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
and strictly concave. Utility maximization26 implies gsfkd = sfkd and yields the inverse
demand functions for the good and the service as:
pfkd =
u′(gfkd − gsfkd)
λ
pfkd + p
s
fkd =
u′(sfkd)
λ
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the consumer’s budget constraint.
The problem of a bi-exporter now becomes:
maxpifkd := (pfkd − τkdcfk) (gfkd−gsfkd)+
(
pfkd + p
s
fkd − ωkτkdcfk
)
sfkd1Ωbkd [F
b] ∀f ∈ Ωbkd
It is therefore separable in
(
gfkd − gsfkd
)
and sfkd. In other words, the price set by a
firm for its good does not depend on whether it is supplying a service or not. This is
because monopolistically competitive firms are λ-takers by assumption, whether their
markups are constant or not.
Supply-side driven price effect.
Under monopolistic competition, without any demand-side explanation, reconciling
larger sales of the good with a higher price is simply not possible as it contradicts the
law of demand. However, sticking to monopolistic competition, we could assume that
preferences feature one-way complementarity while the price effect, instead of arising
from oligopoly, would be driven by the supply side. For the price of the good to be
higher when a service is jointly exported, it would have to be that the marginal cost of
production of that good goes up when bundled with a service, i.e. decreasing returns
to scope. Now, for the overall sales of the good to go up as observed, it would have to
be that the sales of the bundle do more than offset the decline induced by decreasing
returns to scope. Under certain parameter restrictions this is perfectly reasonable and
would replicate comparisons within countries across firms; however, it sounds much
less convincing when coming to within-firm across-country comparisons. Replicating
our results would require that decreasing scope economies are destination specific, i.e.
producing a good would be costlier - net of the service production cost itself - in a
destination when bundled with a service to be shipped to that same destination.
Services as a fringe item in the firm’s scope of activities.
26Ckd is not a consumer index and two-stage budgeting does not apply anymore, but this is not a
concern for the argument that follows.
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We could see bi-exporters as multi-product firms for which the good is the firm’s
core competence and the service a peripheral product.
In Eckel and Neary (2010), a firm’s decisions for each product are interconnected,
again, through a cannibalization effect. This is a model that could capture, for instance,
a firm selling a printer and also renting it. Everything else being equal, however, selling
two substitutable goods implies lower sales for each good compared to the case where
only one is sold.
These types of models are thus unable to replicate the positive association between
goods and services we find with our difference-in-difference setting in the data.
Two-way complementarity between goods and services.
The model considers that each bi-exporter faces demand for both the good and the
good augmented with the service. We consider, here, the special case where goods and
services are two-way complements, i.e. that services are also necessary to the consump-
tion of the good. In the present model, where complementarity is captured through a
Leontiev aggregator, the price of the good and the service are no longer determined.
The impact on quantities, however, can be derived. When the service provider is also
a monopolist, the problem for each variety boils down to a Cournot (1838) comple-
mentary monopoly problem. In that case, internalizing the positive price externality
for the good provider leads her to decrease the price of the bundle and increase the
quantity supplied. To get some prediction on prices, it is enough to introduce some
degree of imperfect complementarity. In that case, producing both the good and the
service in-house tends to increase the sales of both and the quantities of both, but also
reduces their prices (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). This is consistent with the model
of Eckel and Riezman (2016), but not with the positive price effect we have identified.
Add-on pricing
In our model of one-way complementarity, the service is very much like an option
or an add-on. The literature on the pricing of add-ons (See for instance Gabaix and
Laibson, 2006; Ellison, 2005) is based on the assumption that consumers do not know
the prices of these options when deciding to buy the essential good. While this theory is
appealing, it mainly offers predictions on the prices of add-ons - which we don’t observe
in our data - but no clear predictions on the price of the essential good. Moreover,
while our model is very stylized, we are able to replicate our empirical results without
assuming myopic consumers.
Heterogeneous consumers and market segmentation.
In our model, aggregate demand, is obtained by assuming that all consumers are
identical and have CES preferences. The same demand system can be obtained assum-
ing that a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers decide first to allocate αkId to each
good k and then decide which variety to buy according to their idiosyncratic taste.
Their second-stage indirect utility for variety fkd is then:
Vfkd = lnαk + ln Id − ln pfkd + εfkd
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when consumed alone or:
Vbfkd = lnαk + ln Id − ln
[
pfkd + p
s
fkd
]
+ εbfkd
when bundled with a service. Under the assumption that
(
εfkd, ε
b
fkd
)
are drawn identi-
cally and independently from a Gumbel distribution with standard deviation pi√
6(σk−1) ,
aggregating consumers’ demand for their preferred variety leads back to the CES pref-
erences considered in the baseline model (see also Thisse and Ushchev (2016) for further
discussions.)
In this setting, supplying the good-service bundle allows firms to segment the market
for product k between high and low-valuation consumers, and thus to extract more sur-
plus overall. Interestingly enough, the presence of high-valuation consumers decreases
the surplus of low-valuation consumers. We leave the distributional implications of
services trade liberalization for future research.
Empirics: Tracking services’ flows and external service suppliers.
On the empirical front, one might worry that services could sometimes be directly
charged with the good. We think that this should not be too often the case since
generally the provision of services (warranties, maintenance, assistance, consultancy
etc.) are the object of a separate transaction or a separate line in the contract so
that they must be declared by firms separately. However, should it be the case, this
means that we might identify among “normal” goods exporters firms that are in reality
bi-exporters, which should drive to zero the price, sales and quantity effects.
Another related issue is that services might sometimes be provided by external
suppliers directly in the destination country. From a purely empirical perspective, this
means that we might consider as “standard” goods flows some flows that in reality
are also bundled with services. Again, if anything, this biases our estimations of the
effect of services provision towards zero. The fact that we do find an effect suggests
that either the presence of external suppliers is negligible, or that the complementarity
is not the same if the service is provided by an external supplier. This is why we do
not model “pure” services suppliers in our theory. In such a framework, their presence
would provide consumers with the further option of purchasing the service from external
suppliers. This would increase the price of the good supplied alone and delete any
difference between bi-exporting and normal exporting. While interesting, this case
does not seem to hold in our empirical results, and in the absence of information on
local services suppliers, the data does not allow us to further analyze this case.
Overall, we are quite confident in the fact that we have identified a new mecha-
nism relating manufacturing and services activities within the firm through demand
complementarities between the two.
6 Conclusion
While the servitization of our economies is often seen as going hand in hand with
deindustrialization, our work provides a different perspective on these two phenomena.
25
By documenting that the very best goods exporters also export services in some of the
destinations they serve, we show that both activities are not necessarily antagonistic.
Moreover, by means of an instrumentation strategy to infer causation, we argue that the
provision of services might actually boost the demand for goods, allowing firms to charge
higher prices without harming the demand for their goods. This can be rationalized in a
model with oligopolistic competition where services are one-way complements to goods
and consumers love variety. By attracting a larger share of the market, firms that export
services together with their goods can increase their markups. Services act as a demand-
shifter for goods, and thus as a vector of perceived vertical differentiation; therefore,
services are a determinant of firm-level differences in goods export performance. Finally,
our results suggest that the liberalization of trade in services, which is at stake in
many bilateral negotiations such as those between the EU and the US for the TTIP
or those with the UK for Brexit, might have also important consequences for trade in
goods in general and for the biggest firms that are bi-exporters in particular. This is
especially true for services that are highly “bundleable” with goods such as business
or computer services. Considering goods and services separately in the negotiation of
trade agreements is thus likely to miss part of the business and welfare gains and losses
related to these treaties.
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Appendix
A Descriptive Statistics
Table A-1: Descriptive statistics on firms and flows
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exports of Goods (firm-product-destination-year, million euros) 2,576,339 0.30 4.53 0.00 3703.40
Weight (firm-product-destination-year, tons) 2,576,339 354,486.30 1.24×107 1 1.34×1010
Service Dummy (firm-product-destination-year) 2,576,339 0.07 0.25 0 1
# years of presence in the market (firm-product-destination-year) 2,576,339 3.09 2.55 1 11
Turnover/Employment (firm-year, million euros) 98,900 0.81 12.82 0.00 1995.76
Service Industry Dummy (firm-year) 98,900 0.44 0.50 0 1
Multinational Firm Dummy (firm-year) 98,900 0.08 0.26 0 1
Note: This table presents some descriptive statistics of the variables used.
Table A-2: Bi-exporting sales premium - Identification on switchers
(1)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt
1 Servfdt 0.067
a
(0.014)
Log # Productsfdt 0.466
a
(0.007)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.322
a
(0.006)
1 AFFfdt 0.113
a
(0.021)
1 PARfdt 0.023
(0.035)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Destination FE Yes
Observations 1,634,212
R-squared 0.896
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-
year level in parentheses.
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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Table A-3: Bi-exporting sales premia by service type
(1)
Dep. Var. ln Expfkdt
1 Transport 0.106a
(0.040)
1 Travel 0.094
(0.064)
1 Communication -0.101
(0.062)
1 Construction -0.031
(0.058)
1 Insurance 0.010
(0.080)
1 Financial 0.306a
(0.041)
1 Computer 0.118b
(0.052)
1 Royaties -0.032
(0.045)
1 Business 0.219a
(0.028)
1 Personal and Cultural 0.393a
(0.107)
1 Government 0.235
(0.249)
Log # Productsfdt 0.707
a
(0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.963
a
(0.005)
1 AFFft 0.301
a
(0.023)
1 PARft 0.190
a
(0.032)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes
Observations 1,652,189
R-squared 0.801
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-
year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
B Further Tables IV
We present in Table B-1 the results of the first step of our identification strategy. More
productive, multinational and service industry firms are more likely to export services
in the destinations where they already export goods.27 Services provision is also more
likely in destinations where multinational firms have foreign affiliates or parent firms.
Finally, our results show that the higher the number of exported products and the
more experienced a firm in a given market, the more likely it is to be a bi-exporter
in that destination.28 Regarding our excluded variables, as expected, we observe that
BIft is positively correlated with the likelihood of bi-exporting. This means that firms
with a product portfolio composed of goods that are more likely to be associated with
27Note that in the second stage these variables will be absorbed by the fixed effect κfkt. For
computational reasons, we cannot include firm-year fixed effects in the probit; due to the incidental
parameter problem, the predicted probability of bi-exporting would then be hard to compute.
28For market experience, we use here the maximum of years of presence observed across all products
exported by firm f in destination d at time t.
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Table A-4: Bi-exporting sales premium - Core product
(1)
Dep. Var. ln Expfkdt
1 Servfdt 0.145
a
(0.023)
1 Servfdt* 1 Core productft 0.878
a
(0.030)
Log # Productsfdt 0.705
a
(0.006)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.961
a
(0.005)
1 AFFft 0.297
a
(0.023)
1 PARft 0.205
a
(0.032)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes
Observations 1,652,189
R-squared 0.801
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-
year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
services have a higher probability of being bi-exporters. The sign of the coefficient on
the interaction term cannot be interpreted due to the non-linearity of the probit model.
We checked however that in a linear probability specification, the coefficient is positive
and significant, suggesting that on average, the effect of the BIft index is magnified in
markets where the demand for services is high.
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Table B-1: Determinants of the probability of bi-exporting
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. 1 Servfdt
BIft 19.190
a 10.340a 12.960a
(1.976) (0.820) (0.527)
BIft× SIdt -0.643a
(0.175)
BIft× IMPSHdt -5.447a
(1.852)
BIft× SRId 0.058a
(0.030)
Log # Productsfdt 0.145
a 0.149a 0.144a
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Log Turnover/Lft 0.071
a 0.071a 0.070a
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.0417
a 0.0428a 0.0413a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
1 MNEft 0.428
a 0.425a 0.428a
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
1 AFFfdt 0.245
a 0.220a 0.242a
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
1 PARfdt 0.258
a 0.256a 0.258a
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
1 Service industry dummyft 0.612
a 0.574a 0.609a
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 503,728 417,751 479,086
Note: Probit model. BIft is the “bundleability” index of the firm-level prod-
uct portfolio with services, SIdt stands for destination-level imports of services
(excluding Belgium from the source countries), IMPSHdt for the share of ser-
vices in overall imports of the destination country and SRId is an OECD mea-
sure of barriers to services trade imposed by the destination country. Standard
errors clustered at the destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05,
c p<0.1.
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Table B-2: IV results - IMPSHdt as instrument
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.763
a 0.289b 0.474a
(0.157) (0.142) (0.057)
Log # Productsfdt 0.643
a 0.678a -0.035a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.992
a 1.002a -0.010a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.283
a 0.337a -0.054a
(0.024) (0.021) (0.010)
PARft 0.177
a 0.220a -0.043a
(0.032) (0.030) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,570,818 1,570,818 1,570,818
R-squared 0.803 0.866 0.920
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 118.929
Note:Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table B-3: IV results - SRId as instrument
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.758
a 0.246c 0.512a
(0.159) (0.143) (0.058)
Log # Productsfdt 0.654
a 0.693a -0.040a
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 1.010
a 1.020a -0.009a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.253
a 0.302a -0.050a
(0.026) (0.022) (0.011)
PARft 0.216
a 0.254a -0.038a
(0.034) (0.032) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,338,656 1,338,656 1,338,656
R-squared 0.810 0.870 0.921
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 118.895
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table B-4: Second-stage results - Services share in firm-level exports <50%
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.840
a 0.368b 0.472a
(0.170) (0.152) (0.061)
Log # Productsfdt 0.648
a 0.681a -0.033a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.992
a 1.003a -0.011a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.286
a 0.341a -0.054a
(0.025) (0.021) (0.010)
PARft 0.180
a 0.222a -0.043a
(0.032) (0.031) (0.011)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,568,510 1,568,510 1,568,510
R-squared 0.803 0.865 0.920
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 102.057
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1. In columns 1-3 we instrument only Servfdt, in columns 4-6 we also instrument
Log # Productsfdt.
Table B-5: IV results - Excluding destinations with parents or affiliates
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.864
a 0.303 0.561a
(0.217) (0.202) (0.083)
Log # Productsfdt 0.649
a 0.683a -0.034a
(0.012) (0.013) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.989
a 0.999a -0.010a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,387,010 1,387,010 1,387,010
R-squared 0.802 0.865 0.922
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 99.715
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table B-6: IV results - Servfdt coded one only for complementary services
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. Log Expfkdt Log Qfkdt Log Pfkdt
Servfdt 0.874
a 0.321c 0.552a
(0.190) (0.170) (0.072)
Log # Productsfdt 0.645
a 0.680a -0.035a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Market Experiencefkdt 0.991
a 1.001a -0.010a
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
AFFft 0.300
a 0.346a -0.046a
(0.033) (0.031) (0.012)
PARft 0.159
a 0.213a -0.054a
(0.033) (0.031) (0.012)
Product-Destination-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Product-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,587,271 1,587,271 1,587,271
R-squared 0.802 0.865 0.920
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Stat 161.605
Note: Standard errors clustered at the firm-destination-year level in parentheses. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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